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NOTES
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: RIGHT TO ATTACK
"VOID" FOREIGN DIVORCE DECREE
Because rigid application of estoppel doctrine in cases involving
attack on "void" divorces could virtually substitute consent for domicil
as an essential element of a valid divorce, many courts have hesitated
to hold the attacking party estopped.' Possibly the reason is that he
furthers not only his own interest but also the state's interest in checking circumvention of its divorce laws. Throughout the past halfcentury there has been a great deal of litigation concerning the rights
of variously situated persons to attack foreign divorce decrees.2
At the turn of the century the Supreme Court of the United States
held that the full-faith-and-credit clause of the Constitution 3 did not
require the state of "matrimonial domicil" to recognize an ex parte divorce granted in another state4 or even a divorce in which both parties
had appeared.5 The last decade, however, has seen a complete change
in this matter. The Court has held that an ex parte divorce in one
state must be recognized under the full-faith-and-credit clause in
another state, provided that the party who secured the divorce was
domiciled in the divorcing state.6 Then in 1948 another big step was
taken when it was held that, if both parties appear in the divorce
proceedings and would thereby be barred in the divorcing state, the
ful-faith-and-credit clause will prohibit either of those parties from
attacking that decree in another state.7
In Johnson v. Muelberger,8 decided March 12, 1951, the United
1E.g., Andrews v. Andrews, 188 U.S. 14 (1903); Hollingshead v. Hollingshead, 91 N.J. Eq. 261, 110 Ad. 19 (Ch. 1920).
2
See Jacobs, Attack on Decrees of Divorce, 34 MicH. L. REv. 749 and 959

(1936).
3U.S. CoNsr. Art. IV, §1, provides: "Full Faith and Credit shall be given in
each State to the public Acts, Records, and Judicial Proceedings of every other
State."
4
Haddock v. Haddock, 201 U.S. 562 (1906); Bell v. Bell, 181 U.S. 175

(1901).

5
Andrews
6

v. Andrews, 188 U.S. 14 (1903).
Williams v. North Carolina, 317 U.S. 287 (1942). Another state can inquire into the question of domicil, however, and is not bound by the recital in
the ex parte decree, Williams v. North Carolina, 325 U.S. 226 (1945).
7
Coe v. Coe, 334 U.S. 378- (1948); Sherrer v. Sherrer, 334 U.S. 343 (1948).
871 Sup. Ct. 474 (1951), Frankfurter, J., dissenting, reversing In re John-
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States Supreme Court extended further the application of the full-faithand-credit clause, with a consequent diminution of the right to attack
divorces of sister states. After the death of decedent's first wife he
remarried twice, and in this case the daughter of the first marriage
contested the right of the third "wife" to claim a widow's share in his
estate. The decedent's second wife had secured a Florida divorce in
which he had entered an appearance, and the daughter, alleging that
the woman now claimifig to be the decedent's widow was never legally
married to him, attacked this divorce on the ground of lack of Florida
domicil on the part of either spouse. The New York court allowed
this, although it recognized that the parties to the Florida divorce,
namely, the decedent and his second wife, would be precluded from
attacking it. The court interpreted the Florida decision in State ex
rel. Willys v. Chillingworth,9 to mean that the daughter would not
be precluded from attacking the decree in Florida and hence that she
should not be prevented from attacking it in New York.
The Supreme Court reversed on the ground that Florida would
have barred the daughter from attacking, and that consequently full
faith and credit demanded that New York also preclude such attack.
The Court correctly points out that the Willys case is not on all fours
with the factual situation here presented, inasmuch as in that case
a prior divorce of the "widow," not of the decedent, was attacked,
and consequently the decedent himself could not be precluded on
the ground of res judicata. Parenthetically, it should nevertheless be
noted that Florida has recently held him estopped under such circumstancesY ° In the Willys case the daughter had sought, in the
circuit court in Palm Beach County, a declaration that the third
"wife" was not her father's widow, and the Supreme Court of Florida
granted the "wife" a writ of prohibition on the ground of improper
venue; since the divorce was granted in Dade County, the action by
the daughter to set it aside should have been brought in that county.
The Supreme Court of the United States recognizes that the Florida
Court did employ some strong dictum: 11 "The rule is settled in this
state that respondent, being heir to her father's estate, has a right to
question the validity of his marriage to petitioner"; but it dismisses
son's Estate, 301 N.Y. 13, 92 N.E.2d 44 (1950).
9124 Fla. 274, 168 So. 249 (1936).
lOGaylord v. Gaylord, 45 So.2d 507 (Fla. 1950); deMarigny v. deMarigny,
43 So.2d 442 (Fla. 1949).
11124 Fla. at 278, 168 So. at 251.
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this dictum with the statement:' 2 "This observation was not directed
at circumstances where res judicata could bind the parent."
Nevertheless, if the parent is effectively bound by his marriage to
the divorcee and precluded from attacking her prior divorce, as later
Florida cases indicate,' 3 the view that Florida would allow the daughter to attack the divorce under those facts logically justifies a similar
attack by a child when the parent is precluded by res judicata occasioned by his appearance in the prior divorce proceeding.
After what it considers a successful distinguishing of the Willys
case, the Supreme Court presents alternative rationales on which
Florida could hold the daughter precluded: (1) she is in privity with
her father and is therefore bound by his estoppel; or (2) she is a
stranger to the decree and consequently has no standing to attack it.
The Court cites no Florida authority for the first alternative but
merely states: 14
"If the laws of Florida should be that a surviving child is in
privity with its parent as to that parent's estate, surely the Florida doctrine of res judicata would apply to the child's collateral
attack as it would to the father's."
Apparently the Supreme Court is here thinking of the nile that estoppel of an ancestor also estops heirs claiming under him; 15 but there is
considerable difference between a dispute between two persons
such as the purported widow and the child, both of whom are claiming an interest in the estate of the decedent, and a dispute between an
heir and some third party who had a claim against the decedent in
his lifetime. 16 In the latter situation, if the decedent would have been
estopped as against the third party, the disability should descend to
his heir; but in the former the estoppel of the ancestor can hardly be
used by one claimant of his estate against another claimant in a
comparable position. This distinction has, however, been overlooked
by some courts, which have used the general rule of estoppel of an
1271 Sup. Ct. at

478.

I3 See note 10 supra.
1471 Sup. Ct. at 478.
'5 E.g., Watt v. Lee, 288 Ala. 451, 191 So. 628 (1939); Gillig v. Stofer, 279
Ky. 349, 180 S.W.2d 762 (1939); Thompson v. Hudgens, 161 S.C. 450, 159 S.E.

80716(1931).

See In re Lindgren's Estate, 298 N.Y. 18, 55 N.E.2d 849 (1944).
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heir to preclude him from attacking a divorce in instances in which
he was attempting to prevent the "widow" from claiming a share in
the estate. 17 The Supreme Court is likewise overlooking this distinction when it suggests that the Florida law may hold the daughter
precluded because of her privity with her father.
In regard to the alternative rationale for the Florida law, the Court

continues: 18
"If on the other hand, Florida holds, as New York does in this
case, that the child of a former marriage is a stranger to the
divorce proceedings, late opinions of Florida indicate that the
child would not be permitted to attack the divorce, since the
child had a mere expectancy at the time of the divorce."

The opinion discusses deMarigny v. deMarigny'9 and Gaylord v. Gaylord,20 which state that one cannot attack a divorce decree unless he
has at the time an existing right interfered with by it.2 1 Mention is
made of the Florida Court's approval of the statement to this effect
in Freeman on Judgments.22 Each of these cases, however, involved
an attack on a divorce by one who subsequently married the divorcee
rather than by children of the prior marriage, and it is possible that
a distinction can be made between attacks by these two classes of
persons.
The majority of the cases on this proposition have arisen in New
York, although there are a few from other jurisdictions, and the only
definite statement that can be made regarding them is that they are
in hopeless confusion. Concerning attack by subsequent spouses, one
171n re Davis' Estate, 38 Cal. App.2d 579, 101 P.2d 761 (1940); Watson v.
Watson, 172 S.C. 362, 174 S.E. 33 (1934).

In the Watson case, however, the

equities favored the alleged widow. Though hesitant about marrying the decedent because of the questionable validity of his Nevada divorce, she finally
consented upon his persuasion that the divorce was valid. Since he was in very
poor health during all of the five years of their married life and she took care
of him very unselfishly, the court deemed her entitled to a widow's share in his
estate.
1871 Sup. Ct. at 478.
1943 So.2d 442 (Fla. 1949).
2045 So.2d 507 (Fla. 1950).
21deMarigny v. deMarigny, 43 So.2d 442, 447 (Fla. 1949); Gaylord v. Gaylord, 45 So.2d 507, 509 (Fla. 1950).
221 FREEMAN, JUDcMENrs §319 (5th ed. 1925); cf. Mumma v. Mumma, 86
Cal. App.2d 133, 194 P.2d 24 (1948).
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line of authority holds them estopped, another not; with respect to
attack by a child of the divorcee the same division exists. For the
sake of clarity, attacks by these two classes of persons will be discussed
separately.
ATrACx BY SUBSEQUENT SPOUSE

In New York, many of the cases have allowed a subsequent spouse
to have his marriage annulled by attacking the prior divorce of his
mate. 23 Not only New York but also Delaware, Massachusetts, South
Carolina, and Vermont have allowed a spouse to attack a prior divorce. 24 In the Ainscow, Porter and Nimmer cases, 25 the heir of the
deceased second spouse, rather than the spouse himself, was attacking the earlier divorce of the putative widow, but this fact was unimportant because the subsequent spouse was held not precluded and
therefore his heirs were not estopped. The rationale of the Ainscow
and Nimmer cases is that the alleged widow cannot rely on estoppel
of the heir, inasmuch as she is in pari delicto with the decedent by
virtue of her participation in planning and procuring the divorce.
The Porter theory, on the other hand, is that the second husband,
although not a party to the divorce proceeding, can attack it collaterally when it threatens his rights.

Other cases, going not quite so far, have allowed the second husband to defend against his wife's action for support by asserting the
invalidity of her divorce from her first husband. They expressly
state, however, that the holding might be to the contrary if he were
23
Davis v. Davis, 279 N.Y. 657, 18 N.E.2d 301 (1938); Lefferts v. Lefferts,
263 N.Y. 131, 188 N.E. 279 (1938); Jackson v. Jackson, 274 App. Div. 43, 79
N.Y.S.2d 736 (1st Dep't 1948); Honig v. Honig, 267 App. Div. 908, 47 N.Y.S.2d
623 (2d Dep't 1944); deMarigny v. deMarigny, 196 Misc. 719, 92 N.Y.S.2d
217 (Sup. Ct. 1949); Swanston v. Swanston, 76 N.Y.S.2d 175 (Sup. Ct. 1947);
Lane v. Lane, 188 Misc. 435, 68 N.Y.S.2d 712 (Sup. Ct. 1947); Brunel v. Brunel,
64 N.Y.S.2d 295 (Sup. Ct. 1946); Sandberg v. Sandberg, 54 N.Y.S.2d 830 (Sup.
Ct.), aff'd, 269 App. Div. 821, 56 N.Y.S.2d 204 (1st Dep't 1945); Oblson
v. Ohlson, 54 N.Y.S.2d 900 (Sup Ct. 1945); Rosenberg v. Perles, 182 Misc. 727,
50 N.Y.S.2d 24 (Sup. Ct. 1944); Lotz v. Lotz, 49 N.Y.S.2d 319 (Sup. Ct. 1944);
Heusner v. Heusner, 181 Misc. 1015, 42 N.Y.S.2d 850 (Sup. Ct. 1943); Risk v.
Risk, 169 Misc. 287, 7 N.Y.S.2d 418 (Sup. Ct. 1938); Schik v. Schik, 6 N.Y.S.2d
949 (N.Y. Dom. Rel Ct. 1938).
24Ainscow v. Alexander, 27 Del. Ch. 545, 39 A.2d 54 (1944); Old Colony
Trust Co. v. Porter, 324 Mass. 581, 88 N.E.2d 135 (1949); Ex parte Nimmer,
212 S.C. 311, 47 S.E.2d 716 (1948); Cook v. Cook, 76 A.2d 593 (Vt. 1950).
23
See note 24 supra.
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seeking affirmative instead of defensive relief.26
Many of the cases allowing the subsequent spouse to attack reason
along this line: the divorce decree is absolutely void because the court
granting it had no jurisdiction, neither party having been domiciled
within the state of its rendition; and since no one can obtain rights
under a void decree the misconduct of the subsequent spouse does
not estop him from attacking it.2 7 That this is approaching the problem from the wrong end has been suggested, inasmuch as the first
inquiry should be into the capacity of the attacker to object to the
decree and not into the validity of the decree.28 However logical
this criticism may be, the fact nonetheless remains that in these cases
the first consideration is often the validity of the decree, with only
secondary, if any, discussion of the standing of the complaining party
to attack.
An additional element appears in many of these cases: the subsequent spouse aided in procuring the divorce, and therefore the court
could have'based an estoppel on this fact. Nevertheless, the former
spouse has been allowed to attack the decree later in spite of complicity therein ranging from mere awareness that the wife contemplated going to Nevada for a divorce, 29 to presence in conferences
with the attorney about it, 30 to actively inducing and advising the
party to obtain it,3 I and, in some instances, to paying all or part of
the incidental expenses.3 2 One who persuades a married person to
get a divorce and pays the cost thereof should not, after marrying the
divorcee, be permitted later to have his marriage annulled on the
26

Maloney v. Maloney, 22 N.Y.S.2d 384 (Sup. Ct. 1940), aff'd, 262 App.
Div. 936, 29 N.Y.S.2d 419 (4th Dep't 1941), aff'd, 228 N.Y. 532, 41 N.E.2d
934 (1942).
27
E.g., Lane v. Lane, 188 Misc. 435, 68 N.Y.S.2d 712 (Sup. Ct. 1947);
Heusner v. Heusner, 181 Misc. 1015, 42 N.Y.S.2d 850 (Sup. Ct. 1948); Risk v.
Risk, 169 Misc. 287, 7 N.Y.S.2d 418 (Sup. Ct. 1938); Schik v. Schik, 6 N.Y.S.2d
949 (N.Y. Dom. Rel. Ct. 1988); Cook v. Cook, 76 A.2d 593 (Vt. 1950).
28
See Note, 17 BROOKLYN L. REv. 70 (1950).
29
Lane v. Lane, 188 Misc. 435, 68 N.Y.S.2d 712 (Sup. Ct. 1947).
3°Lotz v. Lotz, 49 N.Y.S.2d 819 (Sup. Ct. 1944).
31
Lefferts v. Lefferts, 263 N.Y. 131, 188 N.E. 279 (1933); Brunel v. Brunel,
64 N.Y.S.2d 295 (Sup. Ct. 1946); Sandberg v. Sandberg, 54 N.Y.S.2d 8.30 (Sup.
Ct.), aff'd, 269 App. Div. 821, 56 N.Y.S.2d 204 (1st Dep't 1945); see Schik v.
Schik, 6 N.Y.S.2d 949, 952 (N.Y. Dom. Rel. Ct. 1938).
32
Jackson v. Jackson, 274 App. Div. 43, 79 N.Y.S.2d 736 (1st Dep't 1948);
Heusner v. Heusner, 181 Misc. 1015, 42 N.Y.S.2d 850 (Sup. Ct. 1943); Risk v.
Risk, 169 Misc. 287, 7 N.Y.S.2d 418 (Sup. Ct. 1938).
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ground of the invalidity of that divorce.
Persuaded by such considerations, a goodly number of courts have
held the subsequent spouse precluded from attacking the prior divorce
decree. 33 These cases are based upon various theories: one who
induces a person to get a divorce and then marries in reliance on the
faith of that divorce should not be allowed to attack it;34 the doctrine
of the Coe3r and Sherrer"6 cases means that "full faith and credit"
requires precluding not only the parties to the proceeding but also
all third parties; 37 or a husband who continues to cohabit with his
wife after learning of the circumstances of her prior divorce is in no
position to attack that divorce and is "not at liberty to play fast and
loose" with the wife. 38
In Shea v. Shea3 9 the wife had obtained a divorce from her first
husband in Illinois, with both parties appearing in the proceeding.
She married Mr. Shea, who subsequently died, and then sought a
decree declaring her his widow. The decedents executor opposed
the suit on the ground that her Illinois divorce was invalid for lack
of domicil, but the court refused to allow this attack. The only factual
distinction between this situation and those discussed above is that
33

Mussey v. Mussey, 251 Ala. 482, 87 Sb.2d 921 (1948); Harlan v. Harlan,

70 Cal. App.2d 657, 161 P.2d 490 (1945); In re Anderson's Estate, 121 Mont.
515, 194 P.2d 621 (1948); Weise v. Hughes, I N.J. Super. 104, 62 A.2d 695

(1948); Kinnier v. Kinnier, 45 N.Y. 585, 6 Am. Rep. 182 (1871); Kaufman v.
Kaufman, 177 App. Div. 162, 168 N.Y. Supp. 566 (1st Dep't 1917); Bane v.
Bane, 196 Misc. 818, 80 N.Y.S.2d 641 (Sup. Ct. 1948), 1 STAN. L. REV. 888

(1949); Holloway v. Holloway, 187 Misc. 888, 68 N.Y.S.2d 915 (Sup. Ct. 1946);
Pandelides v. Pandelides, 182 Misc. 819, 47 N.Y.S.2d 247 (Sup. Ct. 1944);
Oldham v. Oldham, 174 Misc. 22, 19 N.Y.S.2d 667 (Sup. Ct. 1940); Heller v.
Heller, 172 Misc. 875, 15 N.Y.S.2d 469 (Sup. Ct. 1989), aff'd, 259 App. Div.
852, 19 N.Y.S.2d 509 (2d Dep't 1940), aff'd, 285 N.Y. 572, 88 N.E.2d 247

(1941).

84 Mussey v. Mussey, Harlan v. Harlan, Kaufman v. Kaufman, Pandelides v.
Pandelides, Oldham v. Oldham, supra note 88.
35
3

Coe v. Coe, 884 U.S. 878 (1948).

GSherrer v. Sherrer, 834 U.S. 84 (1948).
37
Bane v. Bane, 196 Misc. 818, 80 N.Y.S.2d 641 (Sup. Ct. 1948), criticized
at 1 STAN. L. REv. 888 (1949) as an unfounded extension of the Coe and

Sherrer doctrines.
38
Heller v. Heller, 172 Misc. 875, 877, 15 N.Y.S.2d 469, 471 (Sup. Ct. 1989),
aff'd, 259 App. Div. 852, 19 N.Y.S.2d 509 (2d Dep't 1940), aff'd, 285 N.Y. 572,
88 N.E.2d 247 (1941).
39-970 App. Div. 527, 60 N.Y.S.2d 828 (2d Dep't 19461
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here the executor of the subsequent spouse, rather than the spouse
himself, made the attack; and in the court's opinion this made no
difference. The primary basis for the decision seems to be the
sociological argument that it would be socially detrimental to permit
persons to seek annulment of their marriages by attacking prior divorces of their spouses. Along this line, the court states:4"
"It would be intolerable to allow a third party or a stranger collaterally to disturb the validity of a matrimonial status or judgment where both the original parties thereto appeared and were
barred from questioning its validity. To afford such an opportunity would give rise to widespread social disorder and
create a fertile field for blackmail."
Although this language is general and apparently would bar attacks
by any third person, the danger that the court is trying to obviate,
namely, widespread social disorder and blackmail, is present primarily
in cases of attack by the subsequent spouse and not to any high degree
in cases of attack by a child of a prior marriage.
ATTACK BY CHILD OF DIVORCED SPOUSE

The leading case, prior to Johnson v. Muelberger, on attack by
children of a prior marriage was In re Lindgren's Estate,41 decided
by the New York Court of Appeals in 1944. With the husband and
wife both domiciled in New York, the husband went to Florida and
there procured an ex parte divorce. Two years later the wife applied
to the Florida court to have the decree amended nunc pro tunc so as
to show her appearance, which was allegedly omitted through inadvertence of her counsel. The Florida court so amended the decree,
and soon thereafter the husband remarried and in 1942 died. The
first wife, as guardian of the minor issue of her marriage with the
decedent, applied for letters of administration on his estate. Her application was opposed by the second "wife," who was entitled to
letters under New York law if the widow of the decedent. 42 The
court decided that the child did have the right to attack the Florida
divorce, inasmuch as neither party to the divorce had a bona fide
domicil in Florida. Although the court assumed that the parties
40d.

at 530, 60 N.Y.S.2d at 827.
41293 N.Y. 18, 55 N.E.2d 849 (1944).
2
4 N. Y. SURROGATE'S CoURT ACT §118.
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themselves could not attack the decree, it held that the child, who
was not a party to the divorce proceeding, should not be estopped.
A later New York case 43 held the child estopped, however, and
predicated the Lindgren result on the ex parte nature of the divorce
proceeding, the wife having entered no appearance until two years
later in her motion for amendment nunc pro tunc. This limitation is
scarcely warranted by the language of the Lindgren opinion, which
indicates that the child was not estopped despite estoppel of the divorced parents by virtue of their appearance: 44
"The petitioner attacks the validity of the Florida decree in behalf of the decedents daughter - not in behalf of the decedent
or of his estate or of the petitioner herself ....
In each instance
we are dealing with matters personal to the claimant; not to the
decedent or his estate. As to the child they are independent
rights to which she claims to be legally entitled as the sole distributee of her father's estate. Of course the child was not a
party to the Florida divorce action and accordingly the judgment
then entered was not conclusive upon her or upon the rights
now asserted in her behalf."
In the Urquhart case 45 an analogous though somewhat different
problem arose. The wife was granted a divorce in Arkansas after the
husband had entered an appearance, although both were residents
of New York. The husband remarried but still cohabited with and
had a child by his "former" wife. That child sought recognition of
his legitimacy, which in turn required proof that the Arkansas divorce
of his parents was void. He was accorded the right to attack the
decree, even though his parents were estopped by their appearance
in the divorce proceeding, and on remand the lower court held that
neither party was domiciled in Arkansas and that the decree was
46
accordingly void.
The court here recognized a problem confronting the Florida Court
in the deMarigny47 and Gaylord48 cases but apparently overlooked
43

1n re Driscolrs Will, 194 Misc. 711, 86 N.Y.S.2d 742 (Surr. Ct. 1949).

44
45

1n re Lindgren's Estate, 293 N.Y. 18, 23, 55 N.E.2d 849, 851 (1944).
Urquhart v. Urquhart, 272 App. Div. 60, 69 N.Y.S.2d 57 (1st Dep't), aff'd,

297 N.Y. 689, 77 N.E.2d 7 (1947).
46196 Misc. 664, 92 N.Y.S.2d 484 (Sup. Ct. 1949).
47

deMarigny v. deMarigny, 43 So.2d 442 (Fla. 1949).
48 Gaylord v. Gaylord, 45 So.2d 507 (Fla. 1950).
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in the Lindgren case as well as in many others. As a general rule,
one other than a party cannot attack a judgment unless it interferes
49
with some right of his existing before rendition of the judgment.
In attempting to overcome this difficulty the opinion states:50
"The impact of the judgment of the sister state upon him would
deprive him of his legitimacy. This is as real and unfair a consequence unless he can be heard now as though he had been in
being and deprived of opportunity to intervene in a matrimonial
action wherein his legitimacy was at stake."
The court accepted a "substitute" for a right in existence at the time
of the divorce proceeding because the consequences of estopping the
child later were just as deleterious to him. 51 Most of the other cases
the divorce proceeding appear to overallowing third parties to attack 52
look this difficulty completely.
Because of the Lindgren and Johnson cases, the New York courts
were quite definitely committed to the proposition that a child of a
divorcee could attack the divorce and thereby prevent a subsequent
wife from claiming a widow's share in the divorcee's estate. The
Johnson decision, before the Supreme Court reversed it, was followed
twice by the New York surrogates, 5 ' who evidently regarded the point
as pretty well settled.
COMPARISON
In those cases involving attack on a prior divorce by a subsequent
spouse attempting to annul his later marriage, the courts are about
evenly split, whereas a substantial majority allow attack by a child
of a prior marriage. Is there any logical reason for such a distinction?

491 FREEMAN, JUDGMENTS §319 (5th ed. 1925).
5

OAt p. 62, 69 N.Y.S.2d at 60.
,'Florida, too. leans toward removal of the stigma of illegitimacy; cf., in the
field of annulment, Note, 3 U. or FLA. L. REV. 339 (1950).
52
E.g., In re Johnson's Estate, 301 N.Y. 13, 92 N.E.2d 44 (1950); Farah ".
Farah, 196 Misc. 460, 92 N.Y.S.2d 187 (Sup. Ct. 1949); In re McCarthy's Estate.
193 Misc. 264, 83 N.Y.S.2d 6 (Surr. Ct. 1948); In re Knowlton's Will, 192 Misc.
1032, 81 N.Y.S.2d 752 (Surr. Ct. 1948). Contra: Hansberger v. Hansberger, 182
Ga. 495, 185 S.E. 810 (1936); Hynes v. Title Guarantee & Trust Co., 273 N.Y.
612. 7 N.E.2d 719 (1937).
52t,, r,-Niilo' Will. q9 N.Y.S.2d 238 (Surr. Ct. 1950); In re Torkkila's Estate,
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From a sociological viewpoint, this question can definitely be answered in the affirmative. As pointed out in the Shea case, 54 it would lead
to widespread social disorder and blackmail to allow a person knowing all the circumstances of the divorce to marry a divorcee and then,
tiring of the marriage, to have it annulled by attacking the prior divorce. The bench is not inclined to lend aid to a person who plays
fast and loose with his spouse and turns metitorious relationships into
meretricious ones.5 5
Such policy considerations must have been in the mind of the
Florid. Court in the deMarigny case: 56
".... it is our view that the interests of society, would be better
served by an adoption of the lesser of two evili -non datur
tertium. We mean that if the parties are left as the court found
them an alleged fraud upon the court might thus appear to be
sanctioned; yet, on the other hand, a judgment favorable to the
appellant-petitioner [second wife seeldng to annul her marriage
because of alleged invalidity of her husband's prior divorce]
would amount to a judicial determination that both the appellant-petitioner and the appellee-respondent Alfred F. deMarigny
had lived in a manifest state of adultery and would open wide
an avenue for fraud (not to mention blackmail) of a character
most difficult to discover . . . . It is our conclusion that the
lesser evil would result from a judgment unfavorable to the
appellant-petitioner's position and that decency, good morals
and the welfare of society would be more nearly satisfied by
such ruling. Certainly, such a decision would be less inimicable
to the interests of our citizens as a whole than one favorable
to the appellant-petitioner for the latter, in our opinion, could
lead to 'widespread social disorder.: See Shea v. Shea 270 App.
Div. 527, 60 N.Y.S. 2d 828, at page 827."
The same sociological premise appears in the Gaylord case, which
98 N.Y.S.2d 460 (Surr. Ct. 1950).
54
See Shea v. Shea, 270 App. Div. 527, 580, 60 N.Y.S.2d 828, 827 (2d Dep't

1946).
55

See Heller v. Heller, 172 Misc. 875, 15 N.Y.S.2d 469 (Sup. Ct. 1939), aff'd,
259 App. Div. 852, 19 N.Y.S.2d 509 (2d Dep't 1940), aff'd, 285 N.Y. 572, 33
N.E.2d 247 (1941).
56deMarigny v. deMarigny, 43 So.2d 442, 446 (Fla. 1949).
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Nodine: Constitutional Law: Right to Attack "Void" Foreign Divorce Decree
UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA LAW REVIEW
quotes from a California opinion

7

as follows: 58

"'To hold otherwise [that is, to allow the subsequent spouse to
have his marriage annulled] protects neither the welfare nor
morals of society but, on the contrary, such holding is a flagrant
invitation to others to attempt to circumvent the law, cohabit in
unlawful state, and when tired of such situation, apply to the
courts for a release from the indicia of the marriage status.'"
Because of the importance that the Florida Court puts on such
considerations, it may be questioned whether the real basis of the
decisions is (1) a sweeping rule that no person can attack a divorce
decree unless he has at its rendition a property interest in being that
it interferes with - a rule that the United States Supreme Court assumes as the law of Florida in applying this doctrine to preclude an
heir from attacking the divorce; or (2) grave concern as to the sociological implications of allowing subsequent spouses to attack. On
this latter basis, attack by such spouses should be forestalled; but the
safeguarding of society does not require extension of the doctrine so
as to bar children.
CONCLUSION

The United States Supreme Court has interpreted the Florida law
to permit a child of a divorcee to attack her divorce for the purpose
of preventing a putative widow from claiming. The opinion recognizes that there is dictum to the contrary in the Willys case, 59 but
adopts the position that the Florida cases denying a subsequent spouse
the right to attack virtually hold that the heirs are barred. This is at
best an argument from analogy. As indicated above, the New York
cases have been quite definite in allowing the heir to attack, and
evenly split on permitting the spouse to attack, thereby indicating
that these two types of attack are not necessarily the same. Moreover, the stronger policy reasons for precluding attack by a spouse do
not apply to attack by an heir.
The most that can be said for the Florida position is that it is in57

Harlan v. Harlan, 70 Cal. App.2d 657, 161 P.2d 490 (1945).
Gaylord v. Gaylord, 45 So.2d 507, 509 (Fla. 1950).
59
State ex rel. Willys v. Chillingworth, 124 Fla. 274, 278, 168 So. 249, 251
(1936).
58
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